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I N S T I T U T I O N a l h e a lT h I N T h e ag e O f T r U m p

The coming tax “reform” cannot possibly be the
great and simplifying stimulus to economic growth
its proponents claim.

The Tax Reform Man Cometh,
and Goeth
Michael J. Graetz

P

resident Trump has recently been taking breaks from tweeting and golfing
to travel around the country promoting
his ideas for “tax reform.” On September 27,
for example, he traveled to Indiana to promote
his tax plan, which he described as “historic
tax relief for the American People.” “We are
going to cut taxes for the middle class, make
the tax code simpler and more fair for everyday Americans, and we are going to bring back
the jobs and wealth that have left our country,” he said. “There’s never been tax cuts like
what we’re talking about,” he bragged. “Our
explicit commitment,” he promised, is “that
tax reform will protect low-income and middle-income households, not the wealthy and
well-connected.”
Michael J. Graetz is professor of law at Columbia
Law School and professor emeritus at Yale Law
School. He served as a top tax policy official in the
George H.W. Bush Administration. This article is
derived from the author’s keynote lecture to the Section of Taxation and Section of Real Property and
Trusts and Estates of the American Bar Association
in Austin, Texas, on September 16, 2017.

But just a few weeks later, Trump’s tax plan
is heading toward a precipice. Everyone knows
that tax reform is easier than health care reform: No one is going to stand up in a town
hall and claim that he will die if the legislation
is enacted. But that doesn’t make enacting tax
legislation easy.
Both the White House and congressional
Republicans are desperate for a “win”—any
win—but they don’t have a lot of votes to
spare. If three Republican Senators vote “no,”
Trump’s promises of “tremendous” tax cuts
will slip away. Bob Corker, the retiring Senator
from Tennessee, has said that if the tax legislation adds even one penny to the deficit, “There
is no way in hell, I’m voting for it.” Arizona’s
John McCain, like Corker, has frequently
feuded with Trump, and he says that he wants
to see “regular order” and some Democratic
votes. That’s a long shot. And more than a few
other Republican wild cards occupy the Senate: Susan Collins of Maine and Kentucky’s
Rand Paul are two. And on December 12,
the wildest card of all, Roy Moore of Alabama
may take the seat now held by Luther Strange,
a sure “yes” vote.
WINTER (JANUARY/FEBRUARY) 2018
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With only a handful of “legislative” weeks
remaining before year’s end, no one knows
exactly what a new tax law might contain. In
April, President Trump gave us one page of principles and another half page that outlined some
specific goals. Three months later, at the end
of July, the so-called Big Six—Secretary of the
Treasury Steven Mnuchin, National Economic
Council (NEC) Director Gary Cohn, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, Senate
Finance Committee Chairman Orrin Hatch,
Speaker of the House Paul Ryan, and Ways and
Means Chairman Kevin Brady—who had been
meeting regularly, released a statement repeating
their goals for more economic growth through
lower tax rates on businesses and individuals, a
reform of international tax rules, greater fairness
(principally through lower tax rates on families),

everyone knows is lower than it will actually be,
by at least 5 and maybe 10 percentage points.
So things were going very smoothly, just like
the GOP effort to “repeal and replace” the Affordable Care Act.
Then, on September 27, the day of Trump’s
Indiana speech, the Sixers released their “Unified Framework for Fixing our Broken Tax
Code.” In its nine pages (about one-third of
which was blank space) they set forth a list of
their proposed tax changes. The proposals include a corporate tax rate of 20 percent and a
special 25 percent tax rate for partnerships and
Subchapter S corporations, labeled a special tax
rate for small businesses—even though nearly
two-thirds of the net income of partnerships is
earned by the largest 1 percent of firms with
more than $50 million in assets.2 On the individual side, the
Sixers’ framework
was
especially
vague.
It anThe tax debate is liable to be mostly
nounced an “aim
about numbers, not about the structure to reduce the
and function of the tax code as it bears current seven tax
brackets, which
on the American political economy.
range from 10
percent to 39.6
percent, to three
tax
brackets,
1
and, of course, less complexity. Shortly thereaf- ranging from 12 to 35 percent.” But the frameter, 45 of the 48 Senate Democrats sent Senator work failed to say at what levels of income these
McConnell a letter containing their three prin- brackets would kick in. The framework also
ciples for tax reform, two of which were that it promised to double the standard deduction and
neither “benefit the wealthiest individuals” nor replace personal exemptions with tax credits
“increase the deficit.” McConnell rejected those for children and other dependents. The Sixers
constraints in a Kentucky minute.
told us that the credit for dependents other than
Then, during the first week of September, children would be $500, but it left to Congress
Secretary Mnuchin announced that the group the amount for child credits. One large New
of six had a “detailed” tax reform plan. The York law firm aptly told its clients that the Sixnext day NEC Director Cohn described it as a ers had handed us a frame without a picture.
The President and congressional leaders
“skeleton” plan—by which he surely meant to
suggest that it needed some flesh, not that it had tell us that the forthcoming tax legislation will
died and was awaiting burial. On September 15, be a once-in-a-generation event—on a scale
Chairman Brady said that the tax plan—sched- equaling or surpassing the Tax Reform Act
uled for release during the week of September of 1986. But it won’t. Just as the health care
25—would not say exactly what the new busi- debate hasn’t really been about care but about
ness tax rate would be. Secretary Mnuchin then how to pay for health insurance, the tax debate
immediately said the plan would announce the is liable to be mostly about numbers, not about
tax rate. Meanwhile, Donald Trump said that the structure and function of the tax code as it
the business rate would be 15 percent—which bears on the American political economy.
16
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The 1986 Tax Reform Act spent 53 weeks
in the Congress. Two years before, the Treasury
had released more than 600 pages analyzing the
various tax reform ideas that led to the landmark
1986 legislation, and in May 1985 President
Reagan had released nearly 500 pages detailing
his proposals. Compared to that, the nine pages
we have gotten so far from President Trump and
the Sixers can only be described as anorexic.
While they have been very forthcoming in parading apparitions of large tax cuts, so far it’s been
all ponies and no manure—with the notable exception of their intention to repeal the deduction
for state and local taxes. Some of the ponies are
not even real. Donald Trump has insisted that
there will be no tax cut for the wealthy. But fewer
than the richest half of 1 percent of people who
die in any year pay the estate tax, which he and
congressional Republicans seem determined to
repeal. And President Trump surely knows from
his own taxes who will benefit from lowering the
tax rate on partnership income.
It is not surprising that our political leaders
are urging that the 1986 tax reform should be the
playbook for tax legislation now. The crowning
domestic policy achievement of Reagan’s presidency, that legislation was widely heralded as the
most important tax legislation since the income
tax was converted into a tax on the masses during World War II. Since some pundits and many
politicians from across the political spectrum are
now calling for a replay, it is worth reviewing
what happened then, and soon thereafter.

T

he 1986 reform increased the permissible
amount of tax-free income; lowered and
flattened income tax rates; shut down massmarketed tax shelters for high-income individuals; curtailed the ability to shift income
to lower-income, lower-rate family members;
and taxed capital gains at the same rate as
ordinary income. By shutting down tax shelters for individuals and repealing tax breaks
for investments in equipment and real estate,
Congress not only financed a reduction in the
corporate tax rate (from 46 to 34 percent) but
also paid for some of the individual rate reductions.3
The corporate changes also made the income tax considerably more neutral across industries. Soon thereafter, the law’s rate-reducing

and base-broadening reforms were mimicked
throughout the OECD. And in the years since,
other OECD countries have continued to lower
tax rates, especially corporate tax rates, while
the United States has largely stood pat.
But the reforms wrought by the 1986 Act
proved neither revolutionary nor stable. The
1986 tax law resulted from an uneasy, temporary marriage between the forces of “justice”
and “virtue.” The conventional Democratic
tax reformers, who were principally interested
in improving tax equity by broadening the income tax base so that income would be taxed
similarly regardless of its source, joined together
with Republican supply-siders and deregulators,
who were most concerned about incentives and
wanted to enact lower tax rates “to get government off the backs” of the American public and
American businesses. The ink was hardly dry
on the 1986 Act before the divorce proceedings
started. Thousands of pages of legislation in the
years since 1986 have narrowed the income tax
base, while the top tax rate has crept upward.
Even though deficits were becoming a serious concern by the mid-1980s, the linchpin of
the 1986 Act was revenue neutrality. By insisting that the new law not reduce government
revenues, the Reagan Administration and the
congressional leadership ensured that amendments to the tax bill could be offered only if
any revenue losses were offset by revenue gains.
Legislators behaved better when to pay Peter
they had to be explicit about just how they intended to rob Paul. The 1986 Act was not only
revenue neutral but also roughly distributionally neutral: The new law was not an occasion for
shifting the distribution of tax burdens down
the income scale to less wealthy families.
The coming tax legislation is unlikely to be
either revenue or distributionally neutral. There
is no revenue pot of gold like the investment
tax credit and individual tax shelters valuable
enough to finance tax cuts today. Nor are we
going to raise business taxes to finance individual tax cuts, as happened in 1986. This time
our leaders seem determined to cut both business and individual taxes. Donald Trump, who
as we know sometimes exaggerates, says that
this is going to be “the biggest tax cut ever.”
That is a high hurdle indeed: Reagan’s tax cut
of 1981 was more than 2 percent of GDP, and
WINTER (JANUARY/FEBRUARY) 2018
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George W. Bush’s tax cuts of 2001 and 2003
amounted to about 2.5 percent of GDP.
Unfortunately, given our deficits and large
debt, the coming tax legislation will resemble
the 1981 or 2001/2003 tax cuts more than
the 1986 tax reform. So the Sixers are fooling
themselves—or they’re trying to fool us.
Alas, given the size of the Federal debt and
the promises for retirement income and health
insurance coverage that have been made to the
now retiring Baby Boom generation, we cannot afford a tax reduction anywhere close to
the level of the Bush tax cuts. We have never
in modern times faced such a dangerous imbalance between the levels of Federal spending and
revenues. The Federal debt as a percentage of
U.S. economic output is now greater than it has
been at any time since the end of World War II.
And back then we had all the money: Europe and Japan were in shambles, and China
was entering a dark communist era. No matter how bad our tax system may have been, our
economy was poised to grow for decades at an
unprecedented pace. And the U.S. government
then owed 98 percent of the money it had borrowed to finance the war to Americans. Now
our national debt is rapidly approaching $20
trillion—more than three-quarters of GDP—
with about half owed to foreigners, some of
whom we cannot rely on to be our friends. At a
5 percent interest rate, interest on Federal debt
alone would cost more than $1 trillion a year.
If we fail to get control of the Federal budget,
rising interest costs will devour an ever-larger
share. Public debt growing to such levels will
also lead to new challenges to the dollar’s role
as the world’s reserve currency. Our growing
national debt thus increases the likelihood of
substantially higher interest rates, inflation,
and another financial crisis. Over time, it can
threaten the living standards of the American
people.
The major tax policy challenge of the 21st
century is the need to address the nation’s fiscal
condition fairly and in a manner conducive to
economic growth. But since California adopted
Proposition 13 nearly forty years ago, antipathy to taxes has served as the glue that has held
the Republican coalition together. Even though
our taxes as a percentage of our economy are
low by OECD standards and low by our own
18
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historical experience, anti-tax attitudes have
become even more important for Republicans
politically, since they now find it hard to agree
on almost anything else. So revenue-positive, or
even revenue-neutral, forms of tax reform—at
least as long as the GOP maintains its legislative
majority—are politically impossible.

O

ne thing we can be sure of is that Congress and the White House will go to extraordinary lengths to disguise the size and the
implications of the tax reductions they intend
to enact. The Senate Budget Committee passed
a budget resolution that requires tax cuts not to
exceed $1.5 trillion over ten years to allow them
to be enacted through “reconciliation,” a procedure that allows tax legislation to pass the Senate with only 51 votes (including that of Vice
President Pence). The House Budget Committee initially insisted that tax legislation not lose
any revenue, but the House will certainly accept
the Senate’s number. The Tax Policy Center,
however, estimates that the changes announced
in the Sixer’s framework will cost at least $2.4
trillion and their largest revenue raiser—repeal
of the deduction for state and local taxes—has
already provoked vigorous opposition from
quite a few Republican representatives. Republican deficit hawks quickly transmogrify into
hummingbirds when tax cuts hit the table.
Some Senators, most notably Pat Toomey
of Pennsylvania and Ted Cruz of Texas, have
called for lengthening the budget window
from ten years to 25 or even thirty years—not
because the ten-year projections have been so
spot on—but to allow tax cuts not to expire
in a decade, as George W. Bush’s did, because
the Republicans will not be able to muster the
sixty votes in the Senate required to avoid a termination date a decade hence. That particular
gambit will not succeed, but other sleights of
hand are ready. The President and his Treasury
Secretary have already made clear that this legislation will produce great optimism about its
effects on economic growth. So we will see “dynamic scoring” that will understate the revenue
costs of the legislation; let us just hope that it
falls short of turbo-dynamic scoring.
We will also undoubtedly see the kinds
of phase-ins and sunset provisions that characterized the 2001 law and combined to
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dramatically understate its real revenue costs.
When the 2001 Bush tax cuts were enacted,
moderate Democrats in the Senate achieved a
“victory” by insisting on reducing the cuts’ projected costs over a ten-year period from $1.6 trillion to $1.3 trillion. But the bill was festooned
with so many phase-ins and phase-outs that the
actual cost over the past 15 years has been far
closer to $3 trillion than to $1.3 trillion.
And beware manipulations of the budget
baseline to make the cuts seem smaller than
they really are; using “current policy” rather
than the traditional current law baseline is one
possible trick. To understand the importance of
the baseline, consider the following exchange
between a police inspector and Johnny Depp
from The Tourist:
Inspector: Now you wish to report a murder?
Depp: No, some people tried to kill me.
Inspector: I was told you were reporting a
murder.
Depp: Attempted murder.
Inspector: Ah, that is not so serious.
Depp: No, not when you downgrade it from
murder. When you upgrade it from room service, it is quite serious.4

Beware of budget baseline scorekeeping
games.
But at least baseline games don’t change people’s behavior. The newest and riskiest funnymoney game is what’s become known inside the
beltway as “Rothification”—that is to convert
401(k) and other similar retirement saving plans
from deductible plans taxable on withdrawal to
nondeductible, nontaxable plans similar to Roth
IRAs. While this idea has to lose revenue in
present value and may cause uncertain, largely
uninvestigated consequences on retirement savings behavior, it would shift at least $1 trillion
into the budget window so that Congress could
use the money to “pay for” tax cuts despite their
long-term revenue costs. Of all the budget gimmicks now being bandied about in Washington,
this one is the most distressing.

W

ith an aging population, rising health
care and education costs, and the extraordinary costs of fighting terrorism and

preventing war, we cannot afford large tax cuts
like those of 2001 and 2003. So, as already suggested, the new law will be disguised to make
us think it more closely resembles 1986. Former
Republican deficit hawks can barely be heard
anymore, now that the politics have shifted
from “shaft Obama” to “support Trump”
(which speaks volumes about their former sincerity). And they believe they need a legislative “win” before the 2018 midterms no matter
what its fiscal costs.
That, of course, is hardly a surprise. The real
question is what will the coming revenue costs
produce in terms of the U.S. economy. It’s not
an easy question to answer; as that well-known
tax philosopher Yogi Berra once said: “It’s tough
to make predictions, especially about the future.” But we can try.
First, we seem certain to get a corporate
rate cut. After the 1986 Act, we had the lowest
statutory tax rate in the OECD; now we have
the highest. In today’s global economy, where
capital moves around the world with the click
of a mouse, this creates nearly irresistible incentives for both U.S. and foreign multinationals
to locate their deductions here and their income
in a low- or zero-tax jurisdiction. So the corporate rate will be lowered—how low it will go
depends on whether the tax base is expanded
and by how much. The 20 percent rate of
framework seems very optimistic, and Donald
Trump’s 15 percent rate is unreal.
While many smaller breaks will probably exit
the tax code, the big questions concern whether
there will be faster write-offs or “expensing” for
capital investments and whether there will be
serious restrictions on interest deductions. The
Sixers’ framework calls for the immediate writeoff (or expensing) of purchases of equipment
during the next five years. It also says that interest deductions of taxable corporations will be
“partially limited.” The framework says nothing
about limiting the interest deductions of partnerships, no matter how large the partnership.
The problem—which is well understood by tax
professionals but not at all by the public—is that
expensing of assets that are debt-financed leads
to negative tax rates, or large subsidies, to investments that would not be made absent the excessive tax breaks. The interest deduction coupled
with expensing of assets will be one of the most
WINTER (JANUARY/FEBRUARY) 2018
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contentious issues of business tax reform, and
how these issues are resolved will not only tell
us how low the corporate rate will go, but also
whether the investment incentives of the new
law will be rational or horribly distortive.
Congress will also abandon our foreign tax
credit system in favor of an exemption system for
dividends from foreign subsidiaries and impose
a low-rate one-time transitional tax on the $2 to
$3 trillion of foreign earnings of U.S. multinationals that have not been repatriated—almost
certainly with a higher rate on cash than on foreign investments in plant and equipment. The
big question for international tax changes will be
what kinds of measures are enacted to prevent
base erosion in a territorial system, an esoteric
subject we don’t have space to detail here. Many
options are being considered, some with vigor-

net income of businesses. This transformation
has produced the Sixers’ call for a lower rate of
tax on partnership income—something that
President Trump has a large personal stake in.
In fact, partnership and other pass-through
business income is especially concentrated
among high earners, with nearly 70 percent accruing to the top 1 percent. One careful study
by Treasury and university economists has estimated that more than 40 percent of the increase
in the top 1 percent share in income between
1980 and 2013 is due to higher pass-through
business income.5 This makes it very difficult,
if not impossible, to reduce the tax rate on partnership income from a top rate of 39.6 percent
to 25 percent and fulfill the oft-repeated promises of President Trump that this tax legislation will not reduce taxes on the wealthy. As
to whether these business
tax cuts actually produce
more jobs and higher
Of course, the new tax law will
wages for middle-class
provide an increase in the credits
workers, as they also
claim, we will have to
for children. What Ivanka wants,
wait and see.
Ivanka gets.
On the individual
side, the rates will of
course become an imous opposition from multinational businesses, portant issue. For more than two decades now,
and no one knows yet which will emerge.
Republicans and Democrats have fought Game
There also seems to be an emerging consen- of Thrones-style battles, as if our nation’s dessus for a special lower tax rate on certain part- tiny turned entirely on whether the top individnership and proprietorship business income, as ual tax rate is 35 percent or 39.6 percent. This
the framework proposes. Along with the tre- struggle echoes the comment about faculty polmendous increase in the importance of inter- itics attributed to Columbia University profesnational income tax rules (which has occurred sor Wallace Sayre that politics in the academy
almost everywhere), there has been a uniquely are so bitter and rancorous “because the stakes
American transformation of the composition of are so low.”
business income. The rise of sovereign wealth
The framework would also double the stanfunds, private equity, and business investments dard deduction. Doubling the standard deducby large university endowments and pension tion will, of course, do nothing to promote
funds has allowed businesses to amass large economic growth or increase wages; it is being
amounts of capital without going to the public recommended simply to enable our politicians
capital markets. This, in turn, has permitted to claim that most folks will be able to file their
the creation of very large business partnerships tax returns on a postcard. As all income tax hisnot subject to the corporate tax.
tory demonstrates, however, postcard returns
About two-thirds of business income is now won’t last long. If they happen, Congress’s taste
earned by partnerships and other flow-through for using tax deductions and credits as if they
entities such as Subchapter S corporations. By were credible solutions to all our nation’s ecocomparison, in the early 1980s taxable corpora- nomic and social ills will transform that posttions accounted for about three-quarters of the card into a booklet.
20
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A large expansion of the Earned Income Tax
Credit, for both single workers and those with
children, would be far better policy. It could
make work pay better and eliminate debilitating marriage penalties for low- and moderateincome workers.
To pay for at least some of their tax cuts, the
Sixers are planning to repeal the deduction for
state and local taxes, but we will see whether that
actually happens. There are nearly sixty Republican Representatives from high-tax districts, so
the political costs of repealing the deduction for
state and local income taxes and property taxes
could prove very high. Once they learn about
this idea, homeowners everywhere will squeal.
A cap on such tax deductions—perhaps limited
to state income taxes—may prove more likely.
Of course, the new tax law will provide
an increase in the credits for children. That is
Ivanka Trump’s domestic policy priority. And
what Ivanka wants, Ivanka gets.
Finally, there is repeal of the estate tax,
which kicks in only for a married couple with
more than $11 million of wealth and is estimated to apply this year to only about 5,200 of
the 2.7 million people who will die. Despite all
the attention in recent years to the growing inequalities of income and wealth, this most progressive piece of our Federal tax system is again
in peril. Virtually every Republican candidate
for President in this century has supported repeal. Despite the truth of the country song refrain: “I’ve never seen a hearse with a luggage
rack,” the opponents of repeal have been unable
to convince the public that this “death tax” is a
tax on recipients of inherited wealth—a tax on
Paris Hilton, not Conrad Hilton.
Enough predictions. I told the Wall Street
Journal in 2009 that Congress would never
allow the one-year estate tax repeal of 2010 to
take effect—that it would be malpractice to
allow the tax to expire for just that one year.
I was only half right: It was malpractice, but
2010 became the year, as Paul Krugman put it,
to “throw mama from the train.” The Tax Policy Center estimated that about 25,000 people
who would have been subject to the estate tax
died that year. And billions of dollars were also
spared future estate and generation-skipping
taxes that year—eliminating taxes on the transmission of wealth to remote generations long

into the future. So as malpractice goes, this example was quite dazzling.
Well...maybe just one more prediction: Tax
legislation that is this controversial, and that
benefits high-wealth individuals and multinational corporations, will open up great opportunities for the Democrats to demagogue—
and not just about the estate tax. The corporate
tax is the worst tax economically: it burdens
productive investments and inspires all sorts of
distortions and chicanery for only 7 percent of
the revenue pie. But it is the most popular tax
politically. So, if the coming tax legislation is
passed with no or only a few Democratic votes,
we will certainly hear a lot in the 2018 and
2020 campaigns about plans to “repeal and replace” it. And as everyone knows, repealing and
replacing legislation on taxes is far easier than it
is on health insurance.

T

he sad truth, of course, is that the coming
tax cuts cannot possibly be the great and
simplifying tax reform that the President and
Sixers claim and that our nation so badly needs.
We are hobbling our nation in today’s competitive global economy by relying so heavily on an
income tax. How have other countries managed
to get their business tax rates so low? By raising
their value-added taxes—taxes on consumption
now used by every other country in the OECD
and by more than 160 countries worldwide.
By enacting a value-added tax of around
12 percent we could eliminate more than 150
million people from income taxation with a
$100,000 family exemption; lower income tax
rates for everyone; reduce the corporate rate
to 15 percent; and protect low- and moderateincome families from any tax increase through
payroll tax credits and expanded refundable
tax credits for children administered through
government-issued debit cards.6 Senator Ben
Cardin of Maryland has introduced legislation
along these lines. But that legislation is now
going nowhere because most of our politicians
believe they can avoid any political heat by insisting on tax cuts alone. Our politicians simply
refuse to tell the truth to the American people.
In 1990, when I was serving at the Treasury
Department, George H.W. Bush came to believe that the nation’s fiscal situation required
serious deficit reduction. And when George
WINTER (JANUARY/FEBRUARY) 2018
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Mitchell, then the Democratic Senate Majority
Leader, made clear that he would not consider
significant spending cuts or new tighter budget rules without tax increases, Bush agreed to
increase taxes, violating his famous “Read my
lips: No new taxes” pledge, because he believed
it was the right thing to do for the country.
He knew it might cost him re-election, and it
did—in no small part because of the betrayal of
Newt Gingrich, who was far more interested in
his own ambitions to be Speaker of the House
than in what was good for the country.
Five years later Gingrich did become Speaker
of the House after Bill Clinton had raised taxes
in 1993—again to address the deficit—this
time with only Democratic votes. In the 1994
election, the Republicans captured the House
of Representatives for the first time since 1954.
After that, political courage over the necessary
level of taxes became scarce. Political courage:
that was so 20th century.
But not all the news is bad. The budget legislation of the 1990s, along with the economic

growth unleashed by the information technology revolution of the late 1990s, completely
eliminated the projected deficits by the year
2000 and produced a Federal surplus for the
first time since 1969. Indeed, the budget surpluses projected by the Congressional Budget
Office were so large that, in March 2001, thenChairman of the Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan told Congress that the Federal government
would soon pay off all of the national debt
and would have to begin investing its surplus
revenues in corporate stocks, a prospect he abhorred. The good news is that this problem has
been solved.
When talking about enacting tax legislation
that they can call “tax reform,” Republicans
keep insisting that “failure is not an option.”
But when it comes to creating a new tax law
that will ably serve the American economy,
enhance the living standards of the American
public, and ensure our nation’s fiscal health in
the 21st century, failure is not just an option. It’s
the only option.

Endnotes
1That

statement was more notable for what the
Sixers said they weren’t going to do: enact a
new consumption-based tax system with border adjustability. This system, they said, had
too “many unknowns associated with it.” With
that, they threw overboard the novel consumption tax House Republicans had proposed in
the summer of 2016, when they, like everyone
else, thought Hillary Clinton would be President. Throwing this so-called BAT tax overboard was a message to its opponents—notably
retail importers like Amazon and Walmart, as
well as the Koch Brothers—that they had won.
I published a widely circulated paper detailing the “known unknowns” of this proposal.
Graetz, “The Known Unknowns of the Business Tax Reforms Proposed in the House Republican Blueprint,” Columbia Journal of Tax
Law (2017).
2Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, “Present Law and Data Related to the Taxation of
Business Income,” September 15, 2017, p. 56.
3Before 1986, the use of pre-tax loss real estate
investments as tax shelters contributed to a
massive market distortion in commercial real
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estate, leading to wasteful oversupply and
misallocation of capital. Today we still have
an oversupply of commercial real estate—
and a greater oversupply than other OECD
countries—but that is for other reasons. See
“What’s Ahead for Retail Landlords,” Cohen
& Steers (June 2017).
4I am grateful to Donald Marron for this illustration.
5Michael Cooper, John McClelland, James
Pearce, Richard Prisinzano, Joseph Sullivan,
Danny Yagan, Owen Zidar, and Eric Zwick,
“Business in the United States: Who Owns It
and How Much Tax Do They Pay?” NBER
Working Paper No. 21651 (2015).
6 This plan was detailed in my 2010 book 100
Million Unnecessary Returns: A Simple, Fair,
and Competitive Tax Plan for the United States
(Yale University Press) with updated estimates
in my article “The Tax Reform Road Not
Taken—Yet,” National Tax Journal (2014). I
presented a briefer version of the plan in these
pages as well. See “How to Shrink the IRS
and Grow the Economy,” The American Interest (November/December 2011).

